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Rent Control—Is the Cure Worse
Than the Disease?

NOTE
1. Oakland rent control ordinance. https:
//oakland.legistar.com/LegislationDetail
.aspx?ID=2680738&GUID=BAED7BF3
-ED56-4A16-A876-37717D4E01D6&
Options=&Search= (accessed January 11,
2019).

REFERENCES
Asquith, Brian J. Forthcoming. “Do Rent
Increases Reduce the Housing Supply under
Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in
San Francisco.” Upjohn Institute Working
Paper No. 19-296. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Autor, David H., Christopher J. Palmer, and
Paray A. Pathak. 2017. “Gentrification and
the Amenity Value of Crime Reductions:
Evidence from Rent Deregulation.” NBER
Working Paper No. 23914. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Levin, Sam. 2015. “When Landlords Target
Tenants in Rent-Controlled Buildings.” East
Bay Express, July 1.
Office of the Mayor of Los Angeles. 2016.
“Mayor Garcetti Announces New Access
to Information on L.A.’s Rent-Stabilized
Buildings.” Los Angeles: Office of the Mayor
of Los Angeles.
Sieg, Holger, and Chamna Yoon, 2016.
“Waiting for Affordable Housing in New
York City.” Working paper. Alexandria, VA:
National Science Foundation.
Tatian, Peter A., and Ashley Williams.
2011. A Rent Control Report for the District
of Columbia. Washington, DC: Urban
Institute.

The article draws on research from the forthcoming
working paper, “Do Rent Increases Reduce the Housing
Supply under Rent Control? Evidence from Evictions in
San Francisco,” published by the Upjohn Institute.
https://doi.org/10.17848/wp19-296
Brian J. Asquith is an economist at the Upjohn
Institute.

4

Labor Market Effects of
U.S. Sick Pay Mandates
Nicolas R. Ziebarth and Stefan Pichler
Background
The United States, Canada, and
Japan are the only industrialized
countries that do not provide universal
access to paid sick leave. In these
countries, sick pay is largely provided
as a fringe benefit by employers on a
voluntary basis (Heymann et al. 2010).
In the United States, coverage rates are
around 65 percent among full-time
workers; low-income, part-time, and
service sector workers have coverage
rates of less than 20 percent (Susser
and Ziebarth 2016). In a given week of
the year, Susser and Ziebarth (2016)
estimate that the total demand for paid
sick leave sums to 10 percent of the
workforce in the United States.
To date, sick leave legislation has
been passed in 11 states, the District of
Columbia, and dozens of cities across
the United States.1 They require that
employees must have the right to earn,
accumulate, and take sick days, typically
up to seven days per year. Some critics
are concerned that these mandates
cause substantial wage reductions for
employees, as well as job losses. Upjohn
Early Career Research Awardee Nicolas
R. Ziebarth of Cornell University and
colleague Stefan Pichler of ETH Zurich
published an examination of these sick
pay mandates in the Journal of Human
Resources (forthcoming).

Findings
The research team used
employment and wage data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics from 2001
to 2016 to compare the labor market
dynamics of the cities and states with
mandates to “synthetic” control cities
and states over time. The research
assessed mandates in nine cities
(including San Francisco, Washington,
D.C., and New York City) and four
states (Connecticut, California,
Massachusetts, and Oregon).
The synthetic control group method
(SCGM) is a relatively recent statistical
method that allows researchers to draw
causal inference. In this specific case, to
benchmark the labor market dynamics
of cities and states that implemented
a mandate, the SCGM produces a
very similar synthetic control group
consisting of fractions of similar
counties and states.
Figure 1 illustrates the SCGM
and some select findings. The left
column shows the findings for three
areas—San Francisco, King County,
and New York City. The right column
shows the findings for three select
states, California, Massachusetts, and
Oregon. The x-axis represents the
normalized timeline in months up
to and since the mandates became
effective, and the y-axis shows the

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n Over the past decade, dozens of cities, eleven states, and the District of Columbia
have passed sick leave legislation.
n Sick pay mandates allow employees to earn and accumulate one hour of paid sick
leave credit per 30–40 working hours.
n Comparing employment and wage dynamics in cities and states that mandated
sick pay with synthetic control regions, there is no evidence that the mandates lead to
major disruptions of local labor markets.
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Figure 1 Employment Dynamics in Regions with Sick Pay Mandates Relative to Synthetic Control Regions
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SOURCE: Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming).
NOTES: The solid vertical lines indicate the months when the mandates became effective, whereas the dashed vertical lines to the left indicate when the
law was passed, and the dashed vertical lines to the right indicate when the “accrual period” was over. Originally published in the Journal of Human
Resources (forthcoming). © 2018 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. Reprinted courtesy of the University of Wisconsin Press.
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outcome measure of interest—in this
case, the number of private sector jobs
as a share of the total population. The
blue lines illustrate the private sector
job development for the “treated” cities
and states that implemented a mandate,
and the orange lines illustrate the
employment dynamics for the synthetic
control counties or states.
An important condition for the
SCGM to produce valid findings is that

We do not find evidence that sick pay
mandates kill jobs or systematically
disrupt local labor markets.
the synthetic control group provides a
valid imitation of the treatment group
in premandate months; in other words,
the solid and the dashed lines should
match as closely as possible in the
months before the mandates became
effective. As seen, this is the case for all
cities and states evaluated. Technical
details aside, the difference in the
outcome for postmandate months then
illustrates the impact of the sick pay
mandate on employment dynamics of
the city or state.
As Figure 1 shows, there is little
evidence that employment dynamics
systematically either improved or
worsened after the introduction of a
sick pay mandate. The graphs look
very similar when assessing the impact
on wage growth in cities and states
with sick pay mandates and when
investigating specific industries, such
as construction or hospitality. More
details and results are in Pichler and
Ziebarth (forthcoming).
When carrying out formal
statistical tests about the difference
in employment and wage dynamics
in treatment and synthetic control
regions, these tests cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no differences at
conventional statistical levels. However,
the statistical tests cannot exclude
modest reductions in wage growth and
employment with absolute statistical

6

certainty, but nor do they find any
evidence for them.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The United States is one of three
OECD countries without universal
access to paid sick leave. Opponents
of sick pay mandates are mainly
concerned with negative employment
or wage effects. Yet, there is no strong
evidence of systematic and disruptive
labor market effects when cities and
states mandate that employees have
the right to earn and take sick days.
Concerns of massive labor market
disruptions are vastly overstated.
The absence of major labor market
disruptions may be a function of how
the U.S. mandates are designed. In
fact, they seem to be more incentivecompatible than their European
counterparts and minimize shirking
behavior, a main concern of opponents.
The reason for this incentivecompatibility is that paid sick days are
personalized, and employees “earn”
them. For every 30–40 hours worked—
that is, for every full-time week of
work—employees earn one hour of
paid sick leave. Unused sick days roll
over to the next year. Because earned
sick days represent a personalized
insurance credit (similar to health
savings accounts) for future health
shocks that are likely to occur (e.g., flu
or illness of a child), we expect shirking
to play a minimal role for most
employees.
However, wages and employment
could still be significantly affected
because of administrative burdens or
psychological effects when employers
overestimate the actual relevance
for their businesses. The findings in
Pichler and Ziebarth (forthcoming),
however, show that this was very
likely not the case. They are able to
exclude employment losses of more
than 2 percent and wage reductions of
more than 3 percent at conventional
statistical levels.
Together with research showing that
influenza-like illness rates decrease as

a result of the mandates (Pichler and
Ziebarth 2017), this finding suggests
that the mandates can be an effective
tool to increase workers’ health and
well-being.
NOTE
1. For an overview, see https://www
.abetterbalance.org/paid-sick-time-laws/
(accessed January 11, 2019).
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The article draws on research from the forthcoming
Journal of Human Resources article and an Upjohn
Institute working paper, which can be found at https://
research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/293/.
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